Knowledge

Factual security-related knowledge that all engineers should be aware of.

Software defects with security ramifications, including implementation bugs and design flaws such as buffer overflows and inconsistent error handling, promise to be with us for years. Recurring patterns of software defects leading to vulnerabilities have been identified, and the BSI team is documenting detailed instructions on how to produce software without these defects.

Title Updated
Evidence of Assurance: Laying the Foundation for a Credible Security Case 2014-11-04
Arguing Security - Creating Security Assurance Cases 2014-11-04
The Development of a Graduate Curriculum for Software Assurance 2013-07-31
Teaching Security Requirements Engineering Using SQUARE 2013-07-31
Development of a Master of Software Assurance Reference Curriculum 2013-07-31
Strengthening Ties Between Process and Security 2013-07-31
Secure Software Development Life Cycle Processes 2013-07-31
Phkmalloc 2013-07-31
OpenBSD 2013-07-31
What Measures Do Vendors Use for Software Assurance? 2013-07-31
Estimating Benefits from Investing in Secure Software Development 2013-07-31
MITRE CWE and CERT Secure Coding Standards 2013-07-25
Tooling in Support of Common Criteria Evaluation of a High Assurance Operating System 2013-07-25
Improving Software Assurance 2013-07-05
Assume that Human Behavior Will Introduce Vulnerabilities into Your System 2013-06-26
Do Not Perform Arithmetic with Unvalidated Input 2013-06-26
Never Use Unvalidated Input as Part of a Directive to any Internal Component 2013-06-26
Treat the Entire Inherited Process Context as Unvalidated Input 2013-06-26
Do Not Use the "%n" Format String Specifier 2013-06-26
Be Suspicious about Trusting Unauthenticated External Representation of Internal Data Structures 2013-06-26
Handle All Errors Safely 2013-06-26
If Emulation of Another System Is Necessary, Ensure that It Is as Correct and Complete as Possible 2013-06-26
Carefully Study Other Systems Before Incorporating Them into Your System 2013-06-24
Clear Discarded Storage that Contained Secrets and Do Not Read Uninitialized Storage 2013-06-24
Use Well-Known Cryptography Appropriately and Correctly 2013-06-21
Design Configuration Subsystems Correctly and Distribute Safe Default Configurations 2013-06-20
Follow the Rules Regarding Concurrency Management 2013-06-20
Ensure that Input Is Properly Canonicalized 2013-06-20
Guidelines Overview 2013-06-20
Ensure that the Bounds of No Memory Region Are Violated 2013-06-20
Use Authorization Mechanisms Correctly 2013-06-20
Use Authentication Mechanisms, Where Appropriate, Correctly 2013-06-19
Integrating Software Assurance Knowledge into Conventional Curricula 2013-05-23
Making the Business Case for Software Assurance 2013-05-21
Models for Assessing the Cost and Value of Software Assurance 2013-05-21
Defining the Discipline of Secure Software Assurance: Initial Findings from the National Software Assurance Repository 2013-05-21
Vstr 2013-05-20
Software Assurance Education Overview 2013-05-15
Assurance Cases Overview 2013-05-14
strncpy_s() and strncat_s() 2013-05-14
Correctness by Construction 2013-05-14
Attack Pattern Glossary 2013-05-14
Attack Pattern Usage 2013-05-14
Foundations for Software Assurance 2013-05-14
Two Nationally Sponsored Initiatives for Disseminating Assurance Knowledge 2013-05-14
Getting Secure Software Assurance Knowledge into Conventional Practice 2013-05-14
A Common Sense Way to Make the Business Case for Software Assurance 2013-05-14
Further Information on Attack Patterns 2013-05-14
Attack Pattern Generation 2013-05-14
SEI: Coding Practices 2013-05-14
Infusing Software Assurance (SwA) into Introductory Computer Science Curricula 2013-05-14
strlcpy() and strlcat() 2013-05-14
strncpy() and strncat() 2013-05-14
OpenBSD's strlcpy() and strlcat() 2013-05-14
strcpy_s() and strcat_s() 2013-05-14
strcpy() and strcat() 2013-05-14
fgets() and gets_s() 2013-05-14
C++ std::string 2013-05-14
Introduction to Attack Patterns 2013-05-14
It’s a Nice Idea but How Do We Get Anyone to Practice It? A Staged Model for Increasing Organizational Capability in Software Assurance 2013-05-13
Consistent Memory Management Conventions 2013-05-13
Design Principles 2013-05-13
Separation of Privilege 2013-05-10
Securing the Weakest Link 2013-05-10
Strong Typing 2013-05-10
Reluctance to Trust 2013-05-10
Psychological Acceptability 2013-05-10
Promoting Privacy 2013-05-10
Never Assuming That Your Secrets Are Safe 2013-05-10
Least Privilege 2013-05-10
Least Common Mechanism 2013-05-10
Failing Securely 2013-05-10
Economy of Mechanism 2013-05-10
Complete Mediation 2013-05-10
Safe Integer Operations 2013-05-10
Runtime Analysis Tools 2013-05-10
Detection and Recovery 2013-05-10
Range Checking 2013-05-10
Randomization 2013-05-10
Null Pointers 2013-05-10
Heap Integrity Detection 2013-05-10
Guard Pages 2013-05-10
Compiler Checks 2013-05-10
Arbitrary Precision Arithmetic 2013-05-10
Windows XP SP2 2013-05-10
Strsafe.h 2013-05-10
SafeStr 2013-05-10
memcpy_s() and memmove_s() 2008-10-06
Attack Pattern References 2006-11-07
Defense in Depth 2005-09-13