All information products included in https://us-cert.gov/ics are provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information about TLP, see https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.
ICS-CERT is aware of a public report of four vulnerabilities with proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit codea affecting the Sinapsi eSolar Light Photovoltaic System Monitor, a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) monitoring product. According to the vendor’s website,b the company is based in Italy. The product has also been also sold as the Enerpoint eSolar Light, Schneider Electric Ezylog Photovoltaic Management Server, Gavazzi Eos-Box, and Astrid Green Power Guardian.
According to researchers Roberto Paleari and Ivan Speziale, the vulnerabilities are exploitable remotely by authenticating to the service using hard-coded credentials. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities would allow attackers to remotely connect to the server and executing remote code, possibly affecting the availability and integrity of the device. This report was released without coordination with either the vendor or ICS-CERT.
ICS-CERT has notified the affected vendor of this report and has asked the vendor to confirm the vulnerability and identify mitigations. ICS-CERT is unaware of any validated mitigations or workarounds at this time. This product is used in the Energy Sector. ICS-CERT is issuing this alert to provide early notice of the report and identify baseline mitigations for reducing risks to these and other cybersecurity attacks.
The report included vulnerability details and PoC exploit code for the following vulnerabilities:
|Vulnerability Type||Remotely Exploitable||Impact|
|Hard-coded Credentials||Yes||Unauthorized Authentication|
|SQL Injection||Yes||Information Leakage|
|Command Execution||Yes||Remote Code Execution|
|Broken Session Enforcement||Yes||Unauthorized Authentication|
Please report any issues affecting control systems in critical infrastructure environments to ICS-CERT.
ICS-CERT is currently coordinating with the vendor and security researchers to identify mitigations.
ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should perform the following.
- Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Control system devices should not directly face the Internet.b
- Locate control system networks and devices behind firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
- If remote access is required, employ secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.
ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures.
ICS-CERT also provides a recommended practices section for control systems on the US-CERT Web site. Several recommended practices are available for reading or download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Organizations that observe any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
ICS-CERT released a follow-up advisory ICSA-12-325-01 Sinapsi Devices Vulnerabilities to the ICS-CERT Web page on
November 20, 2012.
For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at:
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.